Introduction
The charter of the International Monetary Fund suggests that nations will enter IMF loan agreements out of need (Reichmann and Stillson 1978; Connors 1979; Gylfason 1987; Bird 1996) . At the same time, scholars have recently argued that leaders often enter IMF programs for domestic political reasons. For example, leaders can use the strict conditions attached to loans to overcome domestic opposition to reforms (Spaventa 1983; Remmer 1986; Vaubel 1986; Putnam 1988; Edwards and Santaella 1993; Bjork 1995; Dixit 1996; Vreeland 2000 Vreeland , 2003 Drazen 2001; Ramcharan 2003) . In a broad sense, we can say that nations enter IMF loans either for discretionary (i.e., domestic political) reasons or out of economic need. The outcome (a loan) may be the same, but different causal paths lead there in different cases.
Statements such as ''Either A 1 or A 2 cause B'' reflect causal complexity, of which Braumoeller (2003) provides numerous examples from political science. When operational measures of A 1 and A 2 are easily observed, such propositions may be readily tested in the context of a ''classic'' linear-in-variables regression model, perhaps augmented with the judicious use of interaction effects. In many cases, however, sufficient conditions for an event's occurrence are difficult to observe. It may be difficult to tell which causal path produced the IMF loan, because leaders do not typically announce their intention to trade domestic sovereignty for a commitment to favored policies. Likewise, international relations scholars posit numerous sufficient conditions for war; in many cases, though, we cannot be certain whether the pursuit of territory (Huth 1996) , miscalculation (Jervis 1976) , diversion (Levy 1989; Rocke 1994, 1995; Smith 1996) , or any other condition produced the result. To cite an example from the study of regulation, when a safety inspector visits a plant and finds no violations, we cannot tell whether compliance or nondetection produced this outcome (Feinstein 1989 (Feinstein , 1990 .
While underlying conditions may be difficult to observe, there may be independent variables that we can observe and that we believe increase or decrease the probability that one or the other underlying conditions is operative. As Braumoeller notes, however, simply lumping together all the independent variables associated with both mechanisms into a single linear-in-variables regression model does not properly capture the datagenerating process implied by the theory, and it does not allow critical distinctions to be drawn among competing causes. Instead of this reduced-form approach, he advocates a family of models called Boolean probit, a generalization of Poirier's (1980) partially observable bivariate probit model. Unfortunately, neither author provides evidence of the estimators' performance in finite samples (via simulation, for example), which are plagued by weak identification and labeling problems. Both sets of problems stem from ambiguity in assigning the marginal impact of a particular independent variable to one or another cause-a difficulty that becomes particularly worrisome when we anticipate competing unobservable causes that each depend on the same exogenous variable. In such a setting, the estimates are identified only through functional form.
To improve our ability to estimate models of causal complexity, we propose using qualitative information to impose additional structure on the estimation process. Consider a model in which two difficult-to-observe causal paths could lead to an outcome of interest. Detailed qualitative studies can sometimes determine whether one or the other was responsible for a particular event. While for the majority of the sample the information as to the cause of an event is censored, in those cases in which the cause is known it can be used to anchor the statistical estimation and eliminate the ambiguity that plagues the partial observability approach.
In this paper, we first introduce a notation and terminology for causal complexity sufficiently general to encompass the various archetypes discussed by Braumoeller and others, and consider how we can translate a logical statement concerning the operation of necessary and sufficient antecedents into a statistical model. We then turn to situations where which of the relevant competing causal mechanisms is responsible for an event is generally censored. After reviewing the partial observability framework, we introduce two approaches for anchoring our statistical analysis with qualitative information. The first, a maximum likelihood approach called threshold observability bivariate probit (throbit), considers a situation in which the data-generating process occasionally produces information on discernible causes when one of two latent variables takes on a particularly large value. In other words, when a case is a particularly notable example of one mechanism, our ability to discern it provides exploitable information. A series of Monte Carlo simulations reveals several advantages of throbit over Boolean probit. The second approach, which we implement using Bayesian methods, is called truncated bivariate probit (trubit). It imposes less structure than throbit, although it exploits the same kind of case information. We conclude with an examination of a competing cause model of IMF agreements, comparing the Boolean probit, throbit, and trubit estimates.
Causal Complexity
We begin with some simple terminology and notation to span different causal statements of arbitrary complexity. We do so for two reasons: First, we wish to provide a framework with which to analyze such statements, redressing a deficiency in discussions of causality in political science; second, because even though our exposition focuses on one particular complex causal statement, the methods we discuss generalize easily to more difficult settings.
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Definition 1: M j is the jth causal mechanism of B (for j ¼ 1, 2, . . . J ) if it consists of one or more conditions A jn j , jointly sufficient for B, where n j ¼ 1, 2, . . . N j indexes the nth condition necessary for mechanism j. Formally,
If J enumerates an exhaustive list of causal mechanisms, then [ J j¼1 M j , B. We then say, following Mackie (1965) , that A ''causes'' B if the former is an insufficient but necessary part of a condition that is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result (an INUS condition).
''Either A 1 or A 2 is necessary to cause B'' (A 1 [ A 2 , B) suggests a causal statement with J ¼ 2 (two causal mechanisms) and N j ¼ 1 for j ¼ 1, 2. The statement ''A 1 and A 2 are both necessary and jointly sufficient for B'' (A 1 \ A 2 , B) suggests a single causal mechanism for the result B. However, note that we could express this case as a pair of mechanisms, each of which causes B's complement: ; A 1 [ ; A 2 , ;B. In other words, if two conditions are necessary and jointly sufficient for an outcome, then the complement of either is by itself a sufficient condition for the outcome's nonoccurrence.
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To move from the formal notation to a statistical model requires (1) introducing uncertainty and (2) properly operationalizing causal mechanisms in terms of exogenous independent variables. With respect to the first requirement, as practitioners we are ordinarily content to make probabilistic rather than deterministic causal statements. With respect to the second, we define our independent variables X as a mapping from the set of relevant antecedent events and their complements to a subset of K-dimensional Euclidean space R K , where K is the number of independent variables necessary to properly operationalize the posited causal mechanisms. The proof is trivial: By Modus Tollens, we have ; (A 1 \ A 2 ) , ;B; by DeMorgan's Theorem, the left side of this statement may be expressed as ; A 1 [ ; A 2 .
Often we are concerned with dichotomous outcomes. Let Y be a dichotomous random variable, with Y i ¼ 1 in the event of a success and Y i ¼ 0 in the event of a failure. Given the above two requirements, a statistical model will take the form
where the function F(Á) takes on values constrained between zero and one.
(Nearly) Full Observability
A common technique used to analyze dichotomous-event data is the linear-in-variables probit model. 3 Assume the existence of a latent, unobserved continuous variable Y * i , whose value is a function of a vector of independent variables X i , a parameter vector b, and a N(0, 1) error term e i :
The event Y * i . 0 is necessary and sufficient to produce an outcome Y i ¼ 1. Hence, conditional on X i the probability that
, where È(Á) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random variable. The probability that Y i ¼ 0 is the complementary probability, 1 ÿ È(X i b). Estimation of b proceeds via maximum likelihood (King 1989) .
Due to the continuity of e, there are an infinite number of combinations of Xs and es each jointly sufficient to make Y * i exceed zero, in turn resulting in the outcome Y i ¼ 1. This is a trivial point, but it illuminates the fact that it is often both possible and desirable to model complex causal statements in the context of this simple model. To wit, given the statement, ''Either disastrous economic conditions or shared partisan identification with a challenger increases the probability that a citizen will vote against an incumbent president,'' there is little reason (assuming our measures are adequate) to abandon the old workhorse.
Likewise, causal mechanisms involving a confluence of factors can often easily be accommodated in the linear-in-variables context through the introduction of multiplicative interaction terms (Clark and Gilligan 2004) . For example, consider the statement, ''A 1 makes B more likely, but only in the presence of A 2 .'' We would reject the null hypothesis corresponding to this prediction if the coefficient on the interaction between our operational measures corresponding to A 1 and A 2 was statistically significant and the coefficient on the independent effect of our measure for A 1 was not. 
Partial Observability
While the above models are simple to estimate and interpret, they rely on the requirement that the presence or absence of various antecedent conditions can in principle be operationalized by a vector of exogenous variables. Unfortunately, many theoretical models in political science reflect causal mechanisms in which conditions are unobservable. For instance, in the IMF example, we have posited that either domestic political considerations or genuine economic need induces leaders to pursue IMF loans. However, we cannot under normal circumstances observe whether one, the other, or both were operative. More generally, consider the following model:
where neither Y 1i nor Y 2i is directly observed. Often Y 1i and Y 2i reflect choices made by strategic actors, so it is improper to consider them exogenous. Our theory may suggest, though, that the probability that each assumes a value of one is a function of some antecedents that can themselves be operationalized by vectors of exogenous variables.
To proceed, we posit the existence of two latent variables: Y * 1i and Y * 2i , with
We assume that e 1 and e 2 are drawn from a standard bivariate normal distribution with error correlation q. We observe
In other words, a success occurs if and only if either latent variable takes on a positive value. Using our earlier notation, M 1 is the mechanism corresponding to Y * 1i . 0, and M 2 is the mechanism corresponding to Y * 2i . 0. Figure 1 depicts this model graphically. Successes are generated exclusively via the first mechanism in the lower right quadrant and exclusively via the second in the upper left. In the upper right quadrant, success is overdetermined. Only in the lower left quadrant, when neither latent variable exceeds zero, do we observe failure. A method to estimate b 1 and b 2 is the bivariate probit with partial observability (Poirier 1980; Abowd and Farber 1982; Przeworksi and Vreeland 2002) , which is a special case of a more general set of models referred to by Braumoeller (2003) as Boolean probit.
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The Boolean probit methodology proceeds via maximum likelihood. Note that Given two causal paths, Boolean probit and partial observability bivariate probit are synonymous. In the current context, we restrict our attention to such instances and employ the names interchangeably.
where È 2 (Á) is the cumulative bivariate normal distribution function. Given these probabilities, we may fully specify a likelihood function, which may in turn be maximized using standard approaches. 6 This model is faithful to the basic framework of Eq. (1); F is just more complicated than previously. Braumoeller (2003) has demonstrated the flexibility of Boolean probit for a wide variety of applications. There are two difficulties with this approach, however. The first is methodological. As he points out, the data requirements necessary for model identification can be quite severe. Poirier (1980) discusses this point at length: Different configurations of data can lead to ridges in the likelihood function or likelihoods with several modes. A minimal requirement for identification is that X 1 contain a regressor not in X 2 (or vice versa). Still, to our knowledge none of the authors cited above have examined the properties of these estimators via simulation (a task to which we turn below), limiting our ability to make statements about the utility of this class of estimators in practice. (Meng and Schmidt [1985] discuss the asymptotic efficiency of several variants of the partial observability model.)
The second problem is one of labeling and interpretation. It will nearly always be the case in social science examples that at least one independent variable will be a component of more than one causal mechanism. Consider the following application from the empirical analysis of regulatory outcomes: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission oversees the safety of civilian nuclear reactors in the United States. In order for us to observe a safety violation, it must be the case that (1) a violation has occurred (assuming no false positives), and (2) conditional on the violation's occurrence, it was detected. There are therefore two causal paths to an outcome of no observed violation: The violation did not occur, or it did occur and was not detected. Feinstein (1989 Feinstein ( , 1990 suggests a version of the partially observable bivariate probit, called detection controlled estimation, to estimate a facility's underlying violation rate given imperfect inspection.
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Now consider the analyst's decision of what independent variables to include in the model. Suppose we believed that one independent variable influenced both the probability of a violation's occurrence and the conditional probability of detection-for example, a change in the number of inspectors on hand. (Feinstein does not consider this variable directly, instead estimating fixed effects for individual inspectors present.) What could we conclude if the sign of the coefficient on the inspectors variable was positive in the detection equation and negative in the violation equation? A reasonable interpretation is that all else being equal, an increase in the number of inspectors improves the quality of inspections while deterring would-be violators.
It is possible, however, that we have mislabeled the equations: What we are calling the detection equation is actually the violation equation, and vice versa. Regulatory relationships have an inherently strategic quality, and this quality can produce all sorts of counterintuitive outcomes. Consider, for example, what might happen if inspectors who work in teams free ride on each others' efforts. In that case, an exogenous increase in the number of inspectors can simultaneously lead to an increase in the number of violations (if firms, anticipating the free riding, disinvest from compliance) and a decrease in the probability of detection (the direct effect of the free riding). This example may seem far-fetched, but it is merely intended to show how the labeling problem can compound a problem of insufficient theorizing.
A third interpretation is that the statistical model is misspecified and that neither equation exclusively represents a single unobservable cause. In that case, we can still learn something about the influence of a change in the inspectors variable on detected violations. However, the model is simply providing the functional form for a complicated set of reduced-form nonlinear interaction effects. 8 More generally, while the partial observability/Boolean model may allow us to make more precise statements about the conditional impact of a particular independent variable on an observed outcome, employing the technique to make predictions about unobserved underlying conditions (e.g., the violation rate) may require a fair amount of faith in the validity of our model specification. In his recent book, Vreeland (2003) provides a detailed examination of why some nations choose to enter IMF loan agreements when suffering declining reserves and why other nations also enter IMF programs despite large robust reserves. In particular, he focuses on the cases of Tanzania, Nigeria, and Uruguay to explain how domestic and economic conditions drove the decision to turn to the IMF on different occasions. For instance, Vreeland demonstrates that while in 1975 Uruguay went under IMF programs due to economic need, its 1990 loan agreement was discretionary. In the context of the discussion above, for a limited number of cases Vreeland (2003) is able to differentiate between events where Y 1i ¼ 1 and those where Y 2i ¼ 1. For the majority of cases this information is censored.
Case studies and other qualitative data assist us in ascertaining the cause of an event.
10 Unfortunately, such qualitative evidence is rarely available for all cases in a sample. If it were, then partial observability would be a moot point. But even if such examples in which causes are revealed are few and far between, can we exploit that information in our large-N analysis?
We propose two methods to overcome the problems of identification and labeling inherent in the partial observability context. Both stake out an intermediate position between the partial observability model and the fully observable multivariate probit (one in which we observe dichotomous variables Y 1i and Y 2i directly; see Greene 2000, pp. 849-857) . The idea behind both approaches is straightforward. Although for this class of problems information on which causal mechanism is responsible for an event is generally censored, we can occasionally discern that a cause was operative. Even if these instances are few and far between, we can use them as ''anchors'' to greatly reduce the identification and labeling problems. Compare the following traditional and Boolean probit models:
. Nonlinearity implies that the marginal effect of X 1 will depend on the value of X 2 in both specifications, but in a more elaborate way for the second:
Gordon (2003) avoids the labeling problem by formally modeling the strategic interaction between the regulator and regulated party directly, and testing the model's comparative statics on detected violations in the context of a structural estimation. While the technique prevents him from making statements about undetected violations, it does allow one to test the effect of independent variables on equilibrium regulatory behavior.
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For a discussion of the benefits of relating case studies and statistical analysis in the context of multivariate matching, see Rosenbaum and Silber (2001) .
A Maximum Likelihood Approach: Threshold Observability

Intuition and Derivation
There are two latent variables, Y * 1 and Y * 2 , and our observed outcome variable is
In the partial observability setting, there are three ways by which Y i takes on values of one, each corresponding to the three success quadrants in Fig. 1 . Now consider another case: One of the latent variables takes on an unusually large value, while the other does not. We define unusually large as exceeding some threshold s . 0. Such a situation might correspond to an observation for which we have detailed qualitative information that has not been collected in the vast majority of cases; in qualitative analyses such cases are often selected precisely because they are particularly illustrative of a specific causal mechanism. Since this information is generally censored we cannot systematically include it in the data matrix. For example, a case study may reveal that though the theory suggests that ''M 1 : (Y * 1 . 0) or M 2 : (Y * 2 . 0) is a causal path to Y i ¼ 1,'' in this instance our descriptive knowledge from the case study informs us that it was really M 1 . In such an instance, we would say the mechanism provided a discernible cause of the outcome to occur.
In other cases we may observe Y i ¼ 1, but there may be a dispute among scholars as to the causal mechanism. Some may be vehement that A 1 was responsible, while others may be equally vehement that A 2 was at work. In such a case, ambiguity persists. Later we will discuss how such scholarly disagreement can be incorporated within a Bayesian context by specifying prior beliefs over competing causal mechanisms. As it is currently constructed, the model suggests that moving from ambiguity to discernibility requires asymmetry between the latent variables. When the two latent variables are both positive and relatively small or both positive and relatively large, one cannot parse out a discernible causal mechanism from studies of individual cases. Discernibility emerges when one causal mechanism stands out relative to the other. Note that discernibility of one cause does not imply that the other cause is inoperative. Cases may emerge in which both latent variables are positive (i.e., the outcome is overdetermined) but for which only one causal mechanism is discernible.
Let d ji ¼ 1 if M j is a discernible cause, and zero otherwise. From the above definitions, we can construct a likelihood function from the underlying probabilities. In the current setting,
The probability of observing a success with ambiguous causality, Pr(
, is simply the complement of the sum of the above probabilities. We refer to this model as the threshold observability bivariate probit, abbreviated as throbit. Comparing Figs. 1 and 2, we immediately see the advantage the threshold observability model can provide over its partial observability (Boolean probit) cousin. In the less structured setting, one could relabel the axes and estimate the same model with a drastically different interpretation. The only things permitting us to identify the Boolean model are the nonlinear functional form and the inclusion of different regressor variables in X 1 and X 2 . If X 1 and X 2 contain the same independent variable, our interpretation of its effect on one or the other unobserved causes hinges entirely on its interaction with the other variables in the model.
In the threshold observability model, case information about discernible causes serves the role of anchors, ''locking-in'' the dimensions by occasionally providing information about the correct dimensional orientation. In effect, the threshold observability model (and our alternative estimator, discussed below) replaces the identification problem with a more tractable censoring problem, making this competing cause model similar in spirit to competing risks duration models (David and Moeschberger 1978; Gordon 2002 ).
Monte Carlo Results: Comparing the Boolean/Partial Observability and Threshold Observability Models
As stated above, previous research on the partial observability probit models report the results of no simulations, thus limiting our ability to learn how the model actually functions in practice. Here we compare the performance of that model and the threshold observability specification in a series of Monte Carlo simulations.
12 In general, recovering estimates for q, the correlation between the error terms e 1 and e 2 , requires a very large sample size, so we constrain q ¼ 0 for the experiments. Partially observable data were generated from the following parameterization:
with e 1i , e 2i fresh N(0, 1) draws for each iteration.
13 Note that the variable X c is common to both equations. Setting s 1 and s 2 permits us to distinguish discernible causes from ambiguous ones. For example, a large s 2 and small s 1 imply, all else equal, the greater discernibility of the first mechanism.
We report summary statistics from three sets of 1000 simulations with different sample sizes. In each, Xs are normal draws held fixed in repeated samples, but we manipulate their means and the value of s 1 and s 2 to control the proportion of failures, successes with ambiguous causes, and successes with discernible causes. Table 1 displays the results of the first set of simulations. Xs and ss are configured such that roughly half the sample consists of successes and half failures. In approximately 10% of the successes the first causal mechanism is discernible, and in 10% the second is. We report the mean Boolean probit and throbit estimates, as well as a measure of relative efficiency (Beck and Katz 1995) : the ratio of Boolean probit's root mean squared error (RMSE) to that of throbit. A number greater than one, therefore, implies throbit's greater efficiency. The first thing to note is that for small sample sizes (N ¼ 100), neither estimator performs particularly well. Comparatively speaking, however, throbit is considerably more efficient. We note also that in 3% of the Boolean probit estimations, the maximum likelihood procedure could not invert the Hessian at the extremum.
Compare these results with those when the sample size equals, respectively, 500, 1000, and 5000. Here both models perform considerably better. Throbit is considerably more efficient in terms of RMSE, but this is not surprising given that Boolean probit does not exploit information about discernible causes. Also, the throbit estimator successfully approximates the true value of ln(s 1 ) and ln(s 2 ). (We estimate the natural log of the ss to insure s . 0 at each step in the maximization algorithm.)
Efficiency is well and good but seems like an inadequate reason to prefer throbit to Boolean probit. After all, improvements in efficiency may come at considerable cost: the need to go out and uncover information about discernible causes, e.g., from case studies. Note, however, that the simulations whose results are posted in Table 1 represent a relatively easy case for both models: Roughly half of the observations have the dependent variable taking on a value of one. In many cases in political science, successes are comparatively rarer, leading to a skewed distribution of the dependent variable. To examine the case of skewed data, we turn to Table 2. In this set of experiments, each of 1000 simulations, the data and ss were set to produce a sample in which the dependent variable took on values of one only approximately 10% of the time. Of those cases, roughly a quarter were instances of success discernibly via the first mechanism, and a quarter discernibly by the second mechanism. Because of poor performance by both models, we exclude consideration of cases in which N ¼ 100. Turning our attention to results for other sample sizes, it turns out that the Boolean probit likelihood sometimes lacks a unique mode: Roughly 13% to 24% of the time for the cases in which N ¼ 500 and N ¼ 1000, it does not converge. To make the results for Boolean probit and throbit comparable, we include in Table 2 only summary statistics for trials in which the former successfully converged.
14 Restricting our attention to these experiments, we see similar results to those in Table 1 . In general, throbit does at least as well if not better than Boolean probit in terms of bias, and considerably better in terms of relative efficiency.
How did the threshold observability model perform when Boolean probit could not? To answer this question, we turn to Table 3 . Here we examine the performance of throbit in the 129 cases in which N ¼ 500 and Boolean probit failed, and the 238 cases in which N ¼ 1000 and the simpler model failed. In terms of bias and RMSE, throbit continues to do a good job recovering parameter estimates even for the ''hard'' cases in which Boolean probit fails outright.
Finally, we consider a third set of experiments representing the minimal identifying conditions for the partial observability model discussed in Poirier (1980) . The latent regressions are
In other words, there is a regressor variable common to both equations, and a second regressor appearing only in the first equation. According to Poirier, given sufficient variation in the data, the partial observability model (and thus Boolean probit) should be identified. However, as Meng and Schmidt (1985) show, the efficiency cost of the model compared with the more structured approaches they advocate is high when the model is just identified. Unfortunately, almost half the time, Boolean probit fails to converge. Summary statistics for Boolean probit and throbit when the former did converge are reported in Boolean probit coefficients are often biased whereas throbit coefficients are not, and throbit is anywhere from 55% to 872% more efficient. Table 5 presents throbit results for the data sets in which Boolean probit failed outright. Throbit continues to perform well, its estimates approximating the bs with low mean squared error. 15 Finally, note that in the partial observability model, a more restrictive case in which both latent regressions contained the same independent variables would not be identified. 16 Because of the dimensional anchoring provided by discernible causal information, a similarly specified throbit model would be identified. Though we do not reproduce the results here, additional simulation revealed that this is in fact the case.
The intuition underlying the threshold model is that, while in general the cause of an event is censored, in some cases we have additional evidence (that cannot be systematically integrated into the statistical model) that points to one cause over another. As we saw in the simulations above, being able to anchor a small subset of the successes allows us to greatly improve the efficiency of our estimation and overcome the labeling and weak identification problems of Boolean probit. Unfortunately, throbit as we have presented it places a somewhat rigid structure on the data that in many cases might be inappropriate. For example, it does not allow scholars to assign cases in which both causal mechanisms are operative (the upper right quadrant in both figures). Moreover, we might be interested in making probabilistic claims about which causal mechanism is operative We note in passing that throbit does less well recovering estimates for ln(s 2 ).
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A similar problem crops up in Heckman-style selection models, necessitating exclusion restrictions. Sartori (2003) provides an alternative approach to this issue by assuming that the errors in both the selection and outcome equations are identical.
based on our prior beliefs. Bayesian methods provide a natural framework for incorporating this type of information.
A Bayesian Approach: Anchoring via Truncation
Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) Estimation and Data Augmentation
A full recounting of the methodology of Bayesian simulation is beyond the scope of the current paper. 17 Here we briefly review the basic concepts in the context of the univariate, linear-in-variables probit model (Albert and Chib 1993; Chib and Greenberg 1998) . As above, we have Y * i ¼ X i b þ e i , with Y i ¼ 1 if (and only if ) Y * i . 0, and e i ; N(0,1). The objective of the Bayesian approach is to update our beliefs about parameters having observed the data. In their seminal paper, Tanner and Wong (1987) show that the Bayesian estimation procedure is greatly simplified by treating realizations of the latent variable Y * i as parameters to be estimated, a method referred to as data augmentation. The MCMC procedure exploits the fact that if the latent data were known, the Bayesian update on b would be simple. In particular, assume a normally distributed prior for b with mean b 0 and variance V 0 . Then, conditional on the latent data Y * , the posterior distribution of b j Y * is normal with meanb b and varianceV V,
ÿ1 . The conditional distribution of the latent data, Y * jb, Y is similarly straightforward. Let TN [ p,q] (l, r 2 ) denote the truncated normal distribution with (untruncated) mean l and variance r 2 , lower truncation point p, and upper truncation point q. Then if N(b b,B B) .
4. Let g ¼ g þ 1 and go to 2.
The initial draws from the sampler are strongly influenced by its starting values. However, after a suitable ''burn-in'' period, the draws from the sampler represent draws from the posterior distribution of b. Therefore the draws from the sampler can be used to approximate the desired distribution. 
The Bivariate Truncation Model
Return to the latent variables intuition of the partial observability/Boolean probit:
For ease of exposition, we will assume zero correlation between the es, although modeling these errors as correlated is fairly simple (Smith 1999) . The Bayesian implementation of the univariate probit model is readily extended to this setting. Since we explicitly model the latent data, it is straightforward to incorporate all our relevant knowledge about truncation, which can be done on a case-by-case basis. Suppose, for instance, that Y i ¼ 0. This implies that Y * 1i 0 and Y * 2i 0. In step 3 of the Gibbs sampler we would draw latent variables such that both were truncated below zero. The extension to successes (Y i ¼ 1) is more interesting.
Suppose Y i ¼ 1. Without any additional knowledge, this implies that either Y * 1i . 0, Y * 2i . 0, or both.
19 This is the Boolean probit setting. Additional knowledge of particular cases can be readily integrated into the model. Suppose, for example, that qualitative evidence suggests that cause 1 (and explicitly not cause 2) is responsible for causing success in a particular observation. The appropriate truncation for this observation is Y * 1i ; TN [0,'] (X 1i b 1 , 1) and Y * 2i ; TN [ÿ',0] (X 2i b 2 , 1) . If, alternatively, mechanism 1 causes the success but mechanism 2 cannot be ruled out, then the appropriate truncation becomes Y * 1i ; TN [0,'] 
In practice, there are numerous implementation issues associated with ensuring that the chain has converged. In the results reported we ran a chain of 200,000 iterations following a burn in period of 100,000 iterations. The chain exhibits a high level of autocorrelation. To reduce the impact of autocorrelation, we thinned the chain by examining only every 20th draw. To test for convergence we ran seven parallel chains of 150,000 iterations from different starting values and discarded the first 10,000 iterations of each chain. We then calculated the within-chain variance, W ¼ 1 mðnÿ1Þ
, and the between-chain variance, B ¼ n mÿ1
2 , where m is the number of chains, n is the number of draws from each chain, h ij is the ith draw from chain j of parameter h, " h h j is the mean of parameter h in chain j, and " " h h " h h is the mean of parameter h across all chains. Gelman and Rubin (1992) propose the statistic
; which converges to 1 if the multiple chains converge to the same distribution. Gelman et al. (1995, p. 322) suggest that ffiffif R R p less that 1.1 or 1.2 are acceptable. In our analyses, for no parameter does ffiffif R R p exceed 1.0003.
19
Although Y * 1i and Y * 2i can be readily simulated by repeatedly drawing untruncated normal variates until conditions on p and q are met (a technique called an ''acceptance/rejection'' algorithm), this is less efficient than the following approach: (X 1i b 1 ) ), and C ¼ È(X 1i b 1 )È(X 2i b 2 ). With probability ) and u is a uniform random number, thenx
) represents a random draw of x, the latent data can be drawn directly without the need for acceptance/rejection methods. different truncation rules in an analogous manner. Once the truncations are established, the posterior distribution of b 1 and b 2 can be simulated using the Gibbs sampler, noting that in both steps 2 and 3 we need to make draws corresponding to both latent regression equations. Based on the sampling rules, we refer to this model as the truncated bivariate probit model, abbreviated trubit.
The Bayesian method is highly appropriate for integrating additional knowledge into the estimation procedure, such as that which would be obtained via qualitative study. Further, the setup described allows any prior additional information about likely causes to be used in assigning truncation of the latent data. We considered above the case in which qualitative evidence discernibly suggested one causal mechanism. However, the method is readily adapted when there is scholarly disagreement. For instance, analyses of case studies looking at a particular observation might suggest that mechanism 1 was 90% likely to have caused the success, mechanism 2 was 5% likely, and both mechanisms caused success with 5%. This is easily simulated in step 3 of the Gibbs sampler. With probability 0.9, Y * 1i is positive and Y * 2i is negative, with probability 0.05 draw Y * 2i positive and Y * 1i negative, and with probability 0.05 draw both latent variables as positive.
As in the throbit setting, qualitative evidence allows us to place additional structure on the estimation problem, this time via the truncation of the latent data. Once again the estimation procedure serves to anchor the underlying dimensions of a complex causal model. The chief difference between the throbit and trubit estimators stems from the intuition underlying when operative causes are observable in principle. The threshold observability model is well suited when a subset of the data consists of what might be called ''glaringly obvious'' cases. For instance, while isolating the cause of a war is in general difficult, in some cases a consensus might exist. As an example, many scholars point to the 1982 Falklands conflict as an example of a diversionary war, as discussed by Levy and Vakili (1992) . Of course, even in this perhaps glaringly obvious case, there is dissent. Welch (1993) argues that the war resulted from a failure to achieve a normatively appropriate settlement through negotiations. The Bayesian context of the trubit estimator allows the researcher to include such scholarly disagreements by specifying probability distributions over the different possible truncation patterns.
Note that while we have discussed threshold observability in the maximum likelihood context and bivariate truncation in a Bayesian setting, we could have done the reverse, because both methods are amenable to either approach. 20 The advantage of the Bayesian methodology is its natural interpretation in terms of bringing additional information to bear on a problem while rigorously quantifying our uncertainty about that information; the advantage of the maximum likelihood approach, as usual, is superior understanding of its asymptotic and convergence properties.
Motives for IMF Loans
We have illustrated our arguments throughout with reference to the competing motives that leaders have to sign IMF agreements. We now turn to the determinants of each, estimating models using Boolean probit, throbit, and trubit. Since the focus of this paper is methodological, we will not delay with a long justification of our independent variables. For a substantive description of this problem see Smith and Vreeland (2003) .
The unit of analysis is the nation-month. Our data consist of 11,816 observations from 1971 onward. For each, we measure whether a nation went under IMF agreement (Y i ¼ 1) or remained free of IMF encumbrances (Y i ¼ 0) (IMF Annual Report 1971 -2002 . We do not examine the decision to exit IMF programs, although the analysis could be readily expanded to address that question (Przeworski and Vreeland 2002) . 21 Because entry into agreements is rare in the data set (only 225 entries, or just under 2%), the dependent variable is highly skewed, making conditions for successful estimation more demanding (as the Monte Carlo simulation revealed).
Several independent variables are included in the domestic/discretionary equation (i.e., M 1 ). First, we consider the subject nation's domestic political institutions. We employ the winning coalition measure, W, of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2002 . This variable, scaled from zero to one, gauges the number of supporters to whom a leader is beholden in order to retain power. As W increases, the ease with which a leader can implement unpopular reform efforts decreases, raising the incentives to seek exogenous reforms through IMF programs. We also employ their effective selectorate measure. This captures the size of the pool of potential supporters from which a leader draws her winning coalition, multiplied by 1 ÿ W. This variable takes its greatest values in corrupt universal franchise systems, where potentially almost anyone can (with very low probability) be brought into a leader's small coalition of supporters. The effective selectorate measure is smallest when either the winning coalition is large or the pool of available supporters is small, as is often the case in juntas or monarchies in which effectively only the military or aristocracy have political rights to choose leaders. This measure describes the degree of a leader's policy autonomy, larger values of which obviate the need to sacrifice domestic sovereignty for policy purposes through the IMF.
Next, we consider the role of a leader's tenure in office. Previous research (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) suggests that the probability that a leader exits from power at a particular point in his tenure given survival in office to that point (i.e., the hazard rate) is steeply declining over time for autocratic leaders (who are able gradually to consolidate their support coalitions) and much less steeply declining for democratic ones. With respect to discretionary IMF loans, democratic leaders should thus be more willing to enter agreements early in their tenure, when their electoral consequences are a far-off prospect. In contrast, autocrats, unencumbered by electoral fears, are more likely to enter agreements later in their tenure. To test this hypothesis, we include a measure of tenure and its interaction with W. (Leadership data are taken from Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003.) The first equation also included a measured of economic growth taken from the World Bank Development Indicators (2001). When economic growth stalls, leaders are mostly likely to desire reforms.
Finally, we consider secular change in global and domestic attitudes about the acceptability of submitting to IMF loans. For global change, we control for the age of the IMF program (calendar year minus 1975), hypothesizing a secular increase in propensity to apply. With respect to local change, the marginal impact on sovereignty is decreasing with each successive loan, so we control for the total number of the country's prior loans.
For the equation operationalizing M 2 (economic need), we included the regime-type variables, as well as measures of annual levels of debt service (percent of GNP), largest 21 In their 2002 article, Przeworski and Vreeland treat the IMF itself as a strategic actor, something we do not undertake here. Further, they consider agreement entry, persistence, and exit, whereas we restrict our attention to the agreement entry decision. monthly change in exchange rate over the previous three months, and level of international reserves (log of total reserves in terms of number of months of imports, from IMF International Financial Statistics quarterly data).
22 Data on economic conditions are taken primarily from the World Bank Development Indicators (2001) and the IMF's International Financial Statistics (2003) .
We assigned discernible cause to a number of cases. In his book on IMF politics, Vreeland (2003) distinguishes several cases in which IMF loans were surely sought for domestic political reasons (e.g., Uruguay 1990), and several others in which they were surely sought for economic need (e.g., Uruguay 1974). We use his case studies as the basis for assigning discernible causes. We have 33 instances of loan agreements corresponding to the first mechanism and 17 via the second (175 loans are ambiguous). Table 6 shows estimates for each cause of IMF agreements. The first, second, and third columns of estimates correspond, respectively, to maximum likelihood estimates (MLEs) for Boolean probit and throbit, and the MCMC estimates for trubit. We experienced some difficulty getting the likelihood estimators to converge for Boolean probit.
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Of course, unlike the simulations above, in this case we do not know the true underlying model. This makes discernible model comparisons difficult. That said, Boolean probit yields very slightly weaker parameter estimates than throbit. In the discretionary equation, the significant variables are year, number of prior agreements, and economic growth. The alternative models also support this conclusion. These results are consistent with Vreeland's (2003, chapter 2) observation: Initially there is a stigma attached to the loss of sovereignty associated with an IMF loan, but this diminishes with time and experience. Contrary to expectations, neither political institutions nor either of the tenure variables is a statistically significant determinant of discretionary loans.
Switching to the need equation, the biggest determinants are debt service and level of reserves. In all models these factors are highly significant. The throbit model also suggests that currency devaluation increases the likelihood of a need-based loan. 24 In the Boolean probit estimates, this relationship was statistically insignificant.
The MCMC estimates for the bivariate truncation model differ slightly from the throbit MLE, although both yield similar substantive conclusions. 25 We also estimated a version of the throbit model in which the error correlation is not assumed to be zero. We estimated the q to be ÿ0.18, although it is not statistically significant. The estimates of the other parameters remain nearly unchanged in this specification (as one might expect), with the coefficients varying by about 1% between models. 26 We do not report these results here. 22 We also examined change in reserves. While the substantitive results did not change markedly with the inclusion of this variable, we experienced considerable problems achieving convergence. Further, the posterior distribution obtained from the Gibbs sampler for this variable was highly skewed. 23 As a robustness check, we estimated models in both Gauss 5.0 using the Maxlik routine and Stata 8.0 using its ML procedures. Using the Newton-Raphson algorithm, Gauss versions of throbit typically converge within about 11-12 iterations with uninformative starting values. Using Stata, we estimated identical parameters for throbit even with different starting values. Estimating coefficients for Boolean probit proved more difficult. With uninformative starting values, the Gauss version of the model did not converge. Using Stata and specifying the ''difficult'' option (which switches between steepest ascent and Newton-Raphson), coefficient estimates depended on starting values. Those reported in Table 6 use the threshold observability estimates as a vector of initial values. 24 Exchange rates are measured as the amount of currency to buy one SDR (an IMF basket of currencies). Hence the positive coefficient indicates that IMF programs are more likely following devaluation. 25 The MCMC estimates used normally distributed priors with mean zero and variance ten. MLE estimates of the Trubit model yield similar results. 26 In the model with error correlation, we estimate atanh(q), which is bounded between ÿ1 and 1.
By anchoring the data through the assignment of ''extreme'' cases, throbit and the bivariate truncation model overcome the problems of weak identification and labeling. The use of evidence outside of the data matrix allows us to sharpen parameter estimates and allows the determinant of each cause of an event to be distinguished more readily. Note. In the MLE estimates the first number corresponds to the parameter estimate and the second number is the estimated standard error. In the MCMC estimates, we report the mean, standard deviation, median, and proportion of the draws greater than zero (from the 100,000 draws of the sample). This latter statistic can be thought of as equivalent to the probability of significance (a, or 1 ÿ a) in classical hypothesis tests. * p , .05; ** p , .01 (two-tailed tests).
We have shown that we can improve the quality and interpretation of estimates in models in which underlying causal mechanisms are largely unobserved, but one might nevertheless question the value of this. A direct reply is that these methods allow us to estimate and distinguish between competing causes. While this is in itself an important goal, we believe it is the use to which these models can be put in determining the consequences of events that is even more important. Selection models have gained increasing importance in political science, and with good reason. Many of the processes we study involve explicit selection. For instance, if we study how someone answers a survey question, we need to remember that those citizens who choose to answer are not a random draw from the population (Berinsky 1999 ). If we examine who wins wars, then again, we need to remember that wars between nations are not a random draw of all the possible disputes between nations (Reiter and Stam 2002 ). The example above shows that nations entering IMF are not a random sample either. If we want to examine the effects of IMF loans, whether in terms of leader survival or economic performance, we need to account for the decision to enter an IMF agreement in the first place.
The most common methods to control for selection are Heckman-type models (Heckman 1976 (Heckman , 1979 Achen 1986; Dubin and Rivers 1989) in which the decision to enter the sample (for instance, to sign an IMF agreement) is modeled as a probit simultaneously with the outcome variable of interest. Such models have allowed social scientists to make remarkable progress. Unfortunately, when there are multiple mechanisms through which an actor might enter the sample, treating selection into the sample as a single probit equation is inappropriate. In the context of IMF loans, theory suggests that the impact of IMF programs on leader survival and economic growth should be very different depending on whether entry into the IMF program was triggered by actual economic need or a leader's desire to exploit IMF conditionality to implement domestic reforms. When democratic leaders take discretionary loans, we expect them to enhance political survival and help promote economic growth. In contrast, when democratic leaders take loans through necessity, we expect it to be detrimental to their survival and to impede economic growth. Since the two mechanisms have competing consequences, it is unsurprising that the aggregate impact of IMF programs is ambiguous. (There is great controversy as to the impact of IMF programs: see Payer 1974; Reichmann and Stillson 1978; Connors 1979; Gylfason 1987; Pastor 1987; Khan 1990; Haggard and Kaufman 1992; Edwards and Santaella 1993; Conway 1994.) Simply controlling for being under an IMF program, without differentiating as to why a leader signed in the first place, does not control for the appropriate contingent circumstance. Using similar estimates to those above, Smith and Vreeland (2003) create measures of the propensity to enter IMF for different reasons. In particular, they estimate the probability that a loan was discretionary rather than need based. These propensity measures strongly influence the impact of IMF programs on leader survival. In particular, loans taken for discretionary purposes strongly enhance survival, while those taken in response to need damage a democrat's tenure.
Conclusion
We provide a method for improving interpretation of and identification for statistical models of complex causes in which the underlying causes are difficult to observe. In short, information on operative causes that is generally censored but that is available in a handful of cases can help anchor the estimation procedure and substantially reduce attendant difficulties in large-N studies. Note that the threshold observability and bivariate truncation models we discuss may be easily generalized to problems far more complex than the one (A 1 or A 2 lead to B) that we have explicated here. Braumoeller's generalization of Poirier's partial observability bivariate probit model to such complex settings is clearly a step toward greater understanding of these processes, but the ambiguous nature of causality implied by the partial observability/Boolean models creates the problems discussed above. Our solution(s), of course, should not be taken as a direct criticism of Braumoeller's recent research on Boolean processes, but as a suggestion for facilitating interpretation of a class of estimators potentially of great use to social scientists.
